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Ensuring the EU’s future as a security provider 




On 25 and 26 June 2015, the Heads of State or Government of the European Union (EU) will convene to discuss the 
implementation of their Conclusions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from December 2013. A substantial 
and frank debate among EU leaders is urgently needed in order to forge a lasting and credible vision for CSDP. 
 
Since early 2014, an intense intra-European assessment process has been put in place to deliver an effective and multi-faceted 
policy response to the many challenges affecting European defence in general, and CSDP in particular. The early results (or 
lack thereof) of such a considerable mobilisation effort have been highlighted in several EU documents last May, including the 
High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) Mogherini’s ‘Report on the CSDP’ and her forthcoming presentation on the 
strategic changes and challenges in the global environment, in possible preparation of a ‘review of the 2003 European Security 
Strategy’, the European Commission’s ‘Report on the Implementation of the Communication on Defence’ from last summer, a 
(rather punchy) ‘Resolution on the Implementation of the CSDP’ by the European Parliament and the ‘Conclusions on CSDP’ by 
the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), largely providing the play script for the Summit’s own resolutions. 
 
Two and a half years after the decision of the (then) European Council President Herman Van Rompuy to put defence back on 
the agenda of EU’s ‘high politics’, the balance sheet of CSDP offers very mixed results in each of its three dimensions: missions 
and operations, capability development and the defence industry. This reflects the wider constraints of the current defence 
debate in Europe, involving the pervasive impacts of the enduring economic and financial crisis on most military budgets, a 
general reluctance towards the use of hard power among policy-makers and citizens, as well as the absence of a clear-cut 
consensus among member states on the exact role of CSDP in the EU’s global strategy. 
 
Once again, the European Council’s overburdened agenda, spanning from the renewed risks of Grexit and the future of EU-UK 
relations, to some delicate discussions on the diverse crises affecting Ukraine and the Mediterranean Sea, will make it difficult to 
secure enough time for an in-depth debate on CSDP. Yet, should EU leaders succeed in ring-fencing a spot in their challenging 
to-do-list, there are five main points that could help guide this much-needed conversation and its potential follow-up. 
 
1) Avoid the automatic generator of statements. The regular, high-level review process inaugurated in December 2013 is an 
important achievement, which needs to be maintained well beyond the forthcoming rendezvous of EU leaders. However, such 
an appointment should avoid becoming an ‘automatic generator of statements’, but rather strive to fully exploit the expected 
added value of a top-level political event. A (relatively) short and clear set of future deliverables for CSDP, accompanied by a 
politically charged emphasis on Europe’s security interdependence, would be an encouraging outcome of the next Summit’s 
CSDP session. 
 
2) Skip catalogues, talk politics. Consequently, EU leaders have to refrain from merely endorsing the bulky catalogue of 
(undoubtedly important) decisions and actions taken at a lower political (e.g. FAC) or bureaucratic (i.e. EU service) level. 
Instead, they actually need to ‘talk (tough) politics’ when discussing a policy area so vital for the security of European citizens 
but severely constrained by (often overplayed) considerations of national sovereignty. 
 
3) Focus on the basic questions about European security in the 21st century. What are the key security challenges? When 
is European military power really needed to tackle crises and conflicts (and when, on the contrary, should other EU tools be 
employed)? Where should Europeans concentrate their security and defence projection in the next years, both geographically 
(EU’s neighbourhood and/or beyond) and function-wise (e.g. territorial defence versus external crisis-management)? How could 
Europeans concretely fulfil their security interests via common operations, capabilities and technologies, while maximising the 






impacts of their anaemic defence spending? And who should be coordinating and streamlining member states’ participation in 
each of the (many) work strands of European security cooperation in the foreseeable future (i.e. EU and its bodies, NATO, mini-
lateral ‘coalitions of the willing’, or a pragmatic combination of all these)? Mogherini’s expected ‘strategic presentation’ could 
provide a useful entrée en matière for this crucial, substantial debate. 
 
4) Craft a policy, not just a toolbox. Like other EU dossiers, CSDP still looks like a (moderately) ordered collection of 
instruments rather than a fully-fledged and truly collective policy like the one called for in EU Treaties. In order for the latter to 
guide the former, European leaders should urgently make up their mind on what kind of overarching political vision and ancillary 
strategic culture (if any) should steer CSDP in the next decade, or else be content with keeping it as a less ambitious, second-
class component of the EU’s external action. 
 
5) Fill the communication gap. Despite its acknowledged shortfalls, since its creation in the late 1990s, CSDP has delivered 
considerable achievements, from its early engagement in the post-war Western Balkans in the early 2000s up to current 
successes such as countering piracy off the Somali coast or securing humanitarian relief in the Central African Republic. If one 
adds on the more technical yet valuable projects by EU bodies enhancing military and civilian capabilities and integrating the 
European defence and security market(s), the overall result amounts to a considerable set of materials to be actively 
communicated to policy makers, public opinion and the media, both in Europe and across the world. Yet so far, little effort has 
been put in making CSDP a true flagship of the EU’s in-depth integration process and its international security engagement. 
Time has come for EU leaders to promptly fill such a risky communication gap. 
 
Since member states will keep occupying the pilot seat in driving CSDP in the foreseeable future, the forthcoming European 
Summit might offer a precious opportunity to ensure the EU’s future as a credible and reliable security provider, one that 
protects and promotes European interests and values in a transforming world (dis)order. 
 
Back in December 2013, EU leaders had commandingly declared that “defence matters”: if they really meant what they said, all 
they have to do now is put their preaching into practice. Europe’s unprecedented security concerns deserve far more than just a 
pro forma CSDP Summit. 
 
 






















Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Commentary are the sole responsibility of the author. 
 
 
